Introduction
Although joint ownership is quite common in the real world, where examples include partnerships, cooperatives, and joint ventures, it is not well understood in the existing literature. A common misconception about joint ownership is to define it as a precommitment to certain profit-sharing rules. But a straightforward profit-sharing contract would achieve the same outcome independent of ownership structure. Assuming that profit-sharing contracts are not feasible due to nonverifiability, the property right theory of the firm, or the GHM approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) , defines asset ownership as allocations of residual control rights over assets. Joint ownership means that residual control rights of an asset are shared by its co-owners, that is, each co-owner has veto power over how to use the asset and cannot be excluded from accessing the asset. However, according to the GHM approach, "joint ownership of an asset is suboptimal," because it provides the fewest investment incentives for every co-owner (Hart, 1995, p. 48) .
To gain some concrete ideas about joint control over assets, let us consider Chinese joint ventures. Bai, Tao, and Wu (1999) collect a sample of 200 joint venture contracts, in which partners of the venture (foreign and local) specify board voting rules for various important corporate issues. Three voting rules are used in these contracts: unanimous, two-thirds majority, and simple majority. Both partners will have veto power over a certain issue if (1) a unanimous voting rule is required, or (2) a two-thirds majority rule is required and no partner has more than two-thirds of the total shares (board composition reflects share contributions), or (3) a simple majority rule is required and the share contribution is 50:50. Bai, Tao, and Wu find that joint control is pervasive in these Chinese joint ventures. In particular, 198 out of 200 firms adopt a unanimous rule for the following issues: amendment of company constitution, merger with a third party, termination of venture, and increase in registered capital and equity transfer to a third party. For other important issues, most of the contracts with specific voting rules give veto power to each partner as well. It seems quite clear that such control structures make it very difficult for a party to exclude its partner and take away the assets of the venture for some other use.
Despite the inferiority of joint ownership predicted by the GHM approach, joint ventures have commanded a majority share of the vast amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and have been an important force in China's rapid economic growth for the last two decades. This is not unique to China: joint ventures are common in FDI in other countries, developing or developed (see, for example, Gomes-Casseres (1989) and the references cited therein). A recent study by Allen and Phillips (2000) finds some positive effects on financial performance when firms form joint ventures or other alliances. 1 This article provides a simple explanation for why joint ownership can be optimal. The explanation is based on the GHM premise, but with one additional feature. In the standard GHM model, two parties make noncontractible relation-specific investments and then bargain over the distribution of the total surplus generated by their investments. Through its effects on the two parties' outside options, asset ownership affects the surplus distribution and hence investment incentives. Notice that relation specificity is often exogenously imposed in the GHM approach. That is, the parties in question can only choose the levels of investment within the relationship (which have positive spillover effects on their outside options) but cannot make other types of investments that may enhance their values outside the existing relationship. This assumption may not be reasonable in many circumstances. For example, each party may often want to exert efforts in searching for alternative business partners or to make investments tailoring to the needs of potential alternative partners. Such searching or investment can be valuable to the investing party even if it does not add value to his trade with his partner, because it may enhance his bargaining position against his partner. In this article, I allow players to have choices between relation-specific investments and general investments.
2
When specific and general investments are complementary, then the GHM results are obtained and joint ownership is suboptimal. In light of this, the standard GHM model can be thought of as the special case where general and specific investments are perfect complements. 3 The idea is that independently owning an asset increases the owner's outside option, giving the owner greater incentives to make general investments and hence greater incentives to make specific investments. In this case, joint ownership destroys the incentive instruments of asset ownership and thus is suboptimal. But when specific and general investments are substitutes, joint ownership becomes an optimal ownership structure. By sharing residual control rights, the co-owners of an asset have the fewest incentives to make general investments, and hence the greatest incentives to make specific investments. Therefore, joint ownership serves as a mutual commitment device when the parties have a choice between relation-specific and general investments. To a large extent, joint ownership in my model amounts to mutual hostage, which can promote cooperation and improve efficiency by committing the parties to their relationship (Schelling, 1960) .
The analysis of the article builds on the following key assumptions of the property right 1 China's foreign ownership policies have certainly forced many foreign firms to accept joint ventures they otherwise would not choose, especially in the early reform years. And although regulation restrictions eased significantly in the late 1990s, joint ventures remain the leading ownership structure for FDI in China, accounting in 1998 for more than 40% of FDI, with fully foreign firms accounting for less than but close to 40% of FDI and various cooperative arrangements taking the remaining share (China Statistic Bureau, 1999) . 2 We can call the latter type of investment "general investment" because the analysis applies equally well to cases in which investment in outside markets also generates returns within the relationship; see the discussion at the end of Section 5.
3 See also Segal and Whinston (2000) for this interpretation of the standard GHM model. theory of the firm: (i) disagreement payoffs affect the final division of trade surplus, and (ii) disagreement payoffs of the two parties are determined by the combinations of their general investments and the assets they control. In the framework of the property right theory of the firm, the fundamental property of joint asset ownership is that neither of the two parties can get the marginal benefits of their general investments combined with the jointly owned assets. In terms of providing investment incentives, the co-ownership of an asset by the two parties is equivalent to no one owning the asset, which is bad for general investments but good for specific investments. In the next section, I shall argue that the legal framework of partnerships in the United States governing default dissolution rules is consistent with this definition of joint asset ownership. I shall also show that my result is unchanged when I allow renegotiation of asset ownership following a breakdown of trade negotiations, under fairly reasonable bargaining assumptions of asset renegotiations that are consistent with those of trade negotiations. The result of this article seems to square well with casual observations about joint ownership. In professional service industries such as law, accounting, consulting, and architecture, specific human capital investments are crucial to firm success, and it is difficult to prevent people from overinvesting in general human capital (or searching for outside opportunities) through contractual means. Because specific and general human capital investments are likely to be substitutes (if total time available is fixed), it makes sense in light of my model that partnerships dominate in such industries. Similarly, joint ventures are often found in R&D cooperation in high-tech industries and between multinational companies and local firms in foreign direct investments, where contractual solutions are hard to find and marginal incentives to invest outside the relationship (e.g., searching for other partners) are strong.
4
A closely related article is Segal and Whinston (2000) , who consider the effects of exclusive trade contracts on investment incentives in a similar environment with complementary or substitute internal and external investments. My analysis focuses on ownership structures. Ownership differs from exclusive trade contracts in that asset ownership gives a party the right to exclude others from accessing an asset, whereas an exclusive trade contract prevents a party from trading with outsiders. In many cases, e.g., joint ventures involving joint production, it may be difficult to define "trade with outsiders" ex post but easy to specify control over assets ex ante.
5 Several other articles have also studied various organizational design issues with complementary or substitute multidimensional investments, e.g, Holmström and Tirole (1991) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Holmström (1999) , Tirole (1999), and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) . In addition, Bai, Tao, and Wu (1999) argue that joint control can sometimes help commit to revenue-sharing contracts. Maskin and Tirole (1999) show that joint ownership can lead to the first-best investment levels if combined with an option-to-sell contract. Halonen (1997) shows that joint ownership may help maintain reputation in a dynamic setting through renegotiation of ownership contracts. 6 The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, and Section 3 presents the assumptions and some preliminary analysis. In Section 4 I characterize the set of equilibrium for the game. Then I derive the optimality of joint ownership in Section 5, followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
The model
The model is an extension of Hart (1995) . To highlight the real differences, I use Hart's symbols and notation whenever possible. Two parties, M1 and M2, are engaged in a business 4 In this regard, marriage might be viewed as a special form of joint venture when community property is the rule for household assets. One difference is that family and divorce laws usually specify the asset ownership arrangement between the husband and wife, so individuals may not have complete freedom to choose their desired ownership arrangements. 5 Besides having different focuses, the two models also differ in several other aspects. First, Segal and Whinston study a more general three-party game (a buyer and two sellers), whereas outsiders in my model are passive. Second, they mainly consider exclusivity on one side of the market (the buyer), whereas the two parties in my model are symmetric. 6 Hart and Moore (1998) compare cooperatives and outside ownership from a perspective different from investment incentives.
relationship. There are two assets, a 1 and a 2 , and M1 (M2) has to "work" on a 1 (a 2 ) to be productive. The timing of the model is as follows.
At date 0, ownership structure is chosen. Let A = {a 1 , a 2 } and ∅ be the empty set. Let A 1 ⊆ A and A 2 ⊆ A be the assets owned by M1 and M2 respectively. Denote an asset ownership structure by A = {A 1 , A 2 }. In this simple setting, there are five ownership structures: (i) no integration
where A 1 = {a 1 , a 2 } and A 2 = φ; (iii) type-2 integration A T 2 = {A 1 , A 2 }, where A 1 = φ and A 2 = {a 1 , a 2 }; (iv) joint ownership A J = {A 1 , A 2 }, where A 1 = {a 1 , a 2 } and A 2 = {a 1 , a 2 }; and (v) outside ownership A 1 = A 2 = φ and A 0 = {a 1 , a 2 }, where player M0 is an outsider who does not make any kind of investment. Here, the overbar on an asset means it is jointly owned by both parties. The exact definition of joint ownership will be made clear shortly. Besides these five basic ownership structures, there can be various hybrid forms of ownerships, for example, type-1 partially joint ownership A J 1 = {A 1 , A 2 }, where A 1 = {a1} and A 2 = {a 1 , a 2 }. It will become transparent that the main result of the article (superiority of joint ownership) holds equally well when we count in those hybird forms. I assume that ownership structure is chosen at date 0 to maximize the total net surplus.
At date 1, M1 and M2 make investment decisions noncooperatively. I assume that each party makes two kinds of investments, "specific" investment and "general" investment. Let (i 1 , i 2 ) be M1's investment choice, where i 1 ≥ 0 is specific and i 2 ≥ 0 is general; let (e 1 , e 2 ) be M2's investment choice, where e 1 ≥ 0 is specific and e 2 ≥ 0 is general. The investment cost to M1 is given by C 1 (i 1 , i 2 ), to M2 by C 2 (e 1 , e 2 ). The joint surplus is S = R(i 1 ) + Q(e 1 ) if M1 and M2 choose to trade with each other at date 2. The assumption that S is independent of ownership structure captures the notion that information or technology is unaffected by ownership structure. The general investment by M1 (M2) enhances his (her) value in the outside market if M1 and M2 do not trade with each other at date 2. The idea is that there is a demand for M1's (M2's) service or product outside of the relationship between M1 and M2, and M1's (M2's) general investment increases the value he (she) can realize in the outside market. Let r (i 2 ; A 1 ) and q(e 2 ; A 2 ) denote the outside option of M1 and M2, respectively. Let s = r + q be the total outside surplus M1 and M2 can generate.
The outside options depend on asset ownership because the owner of an asset can take the asset with him/her to the outside market and thus enhance his/her value. This is clear when an asset is owned solely by one party. Let us suppose that there is an active asset market, and the market value for a set of assets is B(A).
7 Let us also denote B 1 , B 2 , and B 12 as the market value for a 1 , a 2 , and {a 1 , a 2 }, respectively. When M1 and M2 break up with each other, each of them actually has two outside choices: (i) they can sell the assets they own to the outside asset market and then trade with some other partner, or (ii) they can use their assets in trading with some other partner. M1 and M2 will choose to sell their assets before trading with some other partner whenever selling assets yields greater payoff. So the outside option (value) of each player is the larger of his payoffs from these two choices. 8 The first choice gives M1 a payoff of r (i 2 ; φ) + B(A 1 ) and M2 a payoff of q(e 2 ; φ) + B(A 2 ). Since it is always possible to sell the assets before trading with some other partner, we should have r (i 2 ; A 1 ) ≥ r (i 2 ; φ) + B(A 1 ) and q(e 2 ; A 2 ) ≥ q(e 2 ; φ) + B(A 2 ) when every asset is owned solely by one party.
When an asset is jointly owned by M1 and M2, what can be done with the asset when they break up? By definition, neither party can take the asset to trade in the outside market (either sell or use) without the consent of the other party. Naturally they will try to come to an agreement on how to dispense the jointly owned assets through negotiations. Some default rule regarding asset disposal is needed in the event that such negotiations fail. In this article, my working definition of joint asset ownership assumes the following default rule for joint assets: in the event of an M1 and M2 breakup, the assets will be sold in the outside asset market and revenue from selling them will be divided between the two. The sharing rule of the asset sale revenue can be specified ex ante in the joint venture agreement. So under joint ownership, M1's outside option is r (i 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = r (i 2 ; φ) + α 1 B 12 , and M2's outside option is q(e 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = q(e 2 ; φ) + (1 − α 1 )B 12 , where α 1 is M1's share of asset sale revenue.
A few points are worth noting about this definition of joint asset ownership. First, my definition is consistent with the common definition of joint asset ownership in the property right theory of the firm. According to Hart (1995) , joint asset ownership means that when trade negotiation breaks down, neither M1 nor M2 has independent access to the jointly owned assets. He then elaborates this by saying that it is equivalent to M1 and M2 independently owning some assets that are "strictly complementary," which means that having access to those assets alone has no effect on M1 or M2's marginal returns of (general) investments. This is the same as my definition, by which we also have r (i 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = r (i 2 ; φ) and q (e 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = q (e 2 ; φ). Second, and perhaps more important, my definition is consistent with the common practice of joint ownership firms in the real world. One of the important forms of joint ownership is partnership. The Uniform Partnership Act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws provides a standard legal framework of partnership firms for all states. In a recent version of the act (1997), its Section 807 that "provides the default rules for the settlement of accounts and contributions among partners in winding up the business" requires that (i) "Each partner is entitled to a settlement of all partnership accounts upon winding up the partnership business" and (ii) "Any surplus must be applied to pay in cash the net amount distributable to partners in accordance with their right to distributions under subsection (b)." In the Comment on the section, it is further explained that "After the payment of all partnership liabilities, any surplus must be applied to pay in cash the net amount due the partners under subsection (b) by way of a liquidating distribution," and the "in-cash rule . . . provides that a partner has no right to receive, and may not be required to accept, a distribution in kind, unless otherwise agreed." 9 Clearly, the default rule in my definition of joint ownership is consistent with that specified in the Uniform Partnership Act, in particular the entitlement of each partner and the in-cash rule. A third point to note about my definition of joint asset ownership is that the default rule of liquidation is just that, the rule that specifies a default for asset disposal in the event M1 and M2 break up with each other. It may well happen that one partner values the jointly owned assets more than the outside asset market and thus attempts to buy them from the other partner, in which case they need to reach a deal about asset reallocation (the "unless otherwise agreed" part in the Uniform Partnership Act). As will become clear below, my model works fine allowing such asset ownership renegotiations under fairly reasonable bargaining environments of asset renegotiations. Thus, what is important in the definition of joint ownership is that it defines an ultimate default rule in the event of disagreement, which does not mean that M1 and M2 need to commit ex ante to such an arrangement (probably quite inefficient ex post) if trade breaks down. In fact, when one party has the highest value for an initially jointly owned asset at date 2, he/she will always get the asset through efficient asset renegotiations.
At date 2, after investment has been made and observed by both parties, M1 and M2 bargain over whether and how to trade with each other. Since there is no information problem, bilateral bargaining will lead to efficient outcomes. As in GHM, we suppose that the bargaining outcomes are given by the split-the-net-surplus solution, i.e., the Nash bargaining solution. This solution is appropriate in situations where the bargainers receive their outside options during the bargaining process or can fall back on their outside options if bargaining breaks down.
10 For simplicity, assume that M1 and M2 have equal bargaining power so they split the net surplus 50:50.
Specifically, for a fixed asset ownership A and investment levels i = (i 1 , i 2 ) and e = (e 1 , e 2 ), we have:
A 2 )] ≥ 0, then M1 and M2 will trade with each other, and the division of the total surplus S depends on the two parties' outside options: M1 will get r + (S − s)/2 and M2 will get q + (S − s)/2.
No-trade equilibria. When S − s = R(i 1 ) + Q(e 1 ) − [r (i 2 ; A 1 ) + q(e 2 ; A 2 )] < 0, then M1 and M2 will not trade with each other and M1 will get a surplus of r (i 2 ; A 1 ) and M2 will get a surplus of q(e 2 ; A 2 ) from their corresponding outside markets.
Note that in the above description of date-2 outcomes, I assume asset ownership is not renegotiable in the event M1 and M2 are to break up their relationship. Although this nonrenegotiable asset ownership assumption is maintained universally in the property right theory of the firm, it is rather unreasonable because it requires too much commitment ability on the two parties and is inconsistent with asset reallocations often observed in the disintegration and dissolution of firms. However, as Cai (2001) shows, this assumption is actually not as limited as it seems. In fact, under quite natural bargaining assumptions of asset renegotiation, allowing asset ownership renegotiation does not affect the model.
Specifically, let us modify the model at date 2 to include an intermediate stage of asset ownership renegotiation. That is, if M1 and M2 are to break up with each other, instead of simply getting r (i 2 ; A 1 ) and q(e 2 ; A 2 ) as the default payoffs determined by their initial ownership agreement, they can renegotiate the asset ownership so as to achieve the maximal dissolution surplus. Given general investment levels i 2 and e 2 chosen at date 1, let A * (i 2 , e 2 ) be an ownership structure that maximizes r (i 2 ; A 1 ) + q(e 2 ; A 2 ), and let s * (i 2 , e 2 ) = s(i 2 , e 2 ; A * ) = r (i 2 ; A * 1 ) + q(e 2 ; A * 2 ) denote the highest joint surplus M1 and M2 can possibly achieve through asset ownership renegotiations. The net gain from asset ownership renegotiation is then s * (i 2 , e 2 ) − s(i 2 , e 2 ; A), where s(i 2 , e 2 ; A) = r (i 2 ; A 1 ) + q(e 2 ; A 2 ) is the joint surplus from the initial ownership structure. Consistent with the bargaining assumptions made in the model, let us suppose that M1 and M2 will divide the net gain from asset ownership renegotiation through the Nash bargaining solution with equal bargaining power. Basically, we assume that the two parties have the same relative bargaining power in asset renegotiation as in trade negotiations.
11 This seems to be quite natural, given that the relative bargaining power is exogenously given in both the Nash bargaining solution and in noncooperative Rubinstein-type bargaining (determined by relative patience or relative risk of bargaining breakdown). Under our assumption about asset ownership renegotiation, after renegotiation of asset ownserhip, M1's payoff is u 1 (i 2 , e 2 ; A) = r (i 2 A 2 ) − .5r (i 2 ; A 1 ). From the above discussion, we see that because of asset ownership renegotiation, the date-2 outcome of the model needs to be modified as follows. When S − s * < 0, then M1 and M2 will not trade with each other and M1 will get a surplus of u 1 (i 2 , e 2 ; A) and M2 will get a surplus of u 2 (i 2 , e 2 ; A). When S − s * ≥ 0, then M1 and M2 will trade with each other. Now M1 will get u 1 (i 2 , e 2 ; A) + (S − s * )/2 and M2 will get u 2 (i 2 , e 2 ; A) + (S − s * )/2, since the disagreement payoffs should take into account asset ownership renegotiation. The following result from Cai (2001) shows that allowing renegotiation of asset ownership has no effect in my model.
Lemma 1. For any initial asset ownership A and investment choices, as long as M1 and M2 trade with each other in both cases of renegotiable or nonrenegotiable asset ownership, M1 and M2 have identical payoffs in these two cases.
breakdown. The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is exactly the split-the-net-surplus solution in the limit when the probability of bargaining breakdown goes to zero (e.g., see Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton, 1989; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990) . 11 The main result of the model will still hold even if the relative bargaining power of the two parties changes modestly from trade negotiation to asset ownership renegotiations.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The basic idea behind Lemma 1 is the following. Suppose M1 and M2 will trade (which is the case we are primarily interested in). Allowing renegotiation of asset ownership means that the disagreement point determined by the initial ownership structure can be moved upward. But as long as the relative bargaining power of the two parties remains the same in the asset renegotiation game, this new disagreement point will be on the line connecting the initial disagreement point and the agreement point. Therefore, bargaining from this new disagreement point will lead to the same agreement point-that is, the same payoff functions for both parties as in the case without asset ownership renegotiation. See Cai (2001) for more details. Given Lemma 1, purely for simplicity, I shall maintain the assumption of nonrenegotiable asset ownership.
In this article I use the Nash bargaining solution to arrive at the division of the surplus from trade. It should be noted that the general idea here can be extended to other bargaining situations whose outcomes are not characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. For example, it can be shown that joint ownership is still optimal under conditions similar to those in this article when outside options serve as constraints on bargaining agreements rather than disagreement payoffs in the Nash bargaining solution-the so-called outside-options principle solution (see Cai (1999) for details).
12 What is critical for my result is that when the parties share residual control rights over an asset, they are forced to share at least some of the marginal returns from general investments combined with the asset in the ex post renegotiations. As long as this is the case, there is a role for joint ownership in encouraging specific investments in the relationship.
Assumptions and preliminary analysis
If M1 and M2 can write contracts on investment or on how to trade, the efficient outcome is easily reached so asset ownership is irrelevant. For asset ownership to be relevant, I assume that no contract (except ownership arrangements) is possible between the two players.
I maintain the following standard assumptions throughout: (i) R(i 1 ) and Q(e 1 ) are positive, increasing, and concave; (ii) r (i 2 ; A 1 ) and q(e 2 ; A 2 ) are nonnegative, nondecreasing, and concave in the first element (i.e., investment); and (iii) both C 1 and C 2 are nonnegative, increasing, and convex.
I also make a number of other assumptions. The first two are standard in the GHM approach.
Assumption 1. Asset ownership increases the marginal product of general investment in the outside options. Formally, for any i 2 , r (i 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) ≥ r (i 2 ; {a 1 }) ≥ r (i 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = r (i 2 ; φ); for any e 2 , q (e 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) ≥ q (e 2 ; {a 2 }) ≥ q (e 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = q (e 2 ; φ).
Note that since no party has exclusive control over the asset under joint control, for each co-owner, the marginal product of general investment under joint ownership is the same as that if he owns no asset. This follows from our definition of joint asset ownership: r (i 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = r (i 2 ; φ) + α 1 B 12 and q(e 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = q(e 2 ; φ) + (1 − α 1 )B 12 .
Assumption 2. Investments are relation-specific: investments yield higher values within the relationship than in the outside markets. Formally, for any ownership structure A = {A 1 , A 2 }, R(i) > r (i; A 1 ) and Q(e) > q(e; A 2 ), where i and e are any scalar investment levels.
Assumption 2 requires that M1 (M2) is essential to realizing Q (R). Specificity on marginal terms (i.e., R > r , Q > q ) is not necessary for my model, but it is sufficient for Assumption 4 in the next section.
Assumption 3. Specific investment and general investment are perfect substitutes for both parties: C 1 (i 1 , i 2 ) = C 1 (i 1 + i 2 ) and C 2 (e 1 , e 2 ) = C 2 (e 1 + e 2 ). 12 Recently, de Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Chiu (1998) have shown that the results of GHM are sensitive to the bargaining solution used in modelling the distribution of surplus in the ex post bargaining stage. Specifically, using the outside-options principle solution, these authors show that it is possible to derive implications about ownership structures that are directly opposite to those in GHM.
Assumption 3 departs from the standard GHM approach and is the driving force behind the optimality of joint ownership. In the general model where choices between specific and general investments are endogenous, the GHM approach can be thought of as making the implicit assumption that specific and general investment are perfect complements. 13 It is easy to see that the qualitative results of the current article hold as long as the two kinds of investments are substitutes (i.e., C 1 and C 2 both have positive cross-derivatives), hence perfect substitution is a simplifying assumption. Likewise, if the investments are complementary, the GHM results are obtained.
If M1 and M2 trade with each other at date 2, the net total surplus is = R(i 1 ) + Q(e 1 ) − C 1 (i 1 + i 2 ) − C 2 (e 1 + e 2 ). To maximize , obviously both i 2 and e 2 should be zero and the optimal i 1 and e 1 satisfy the following first-order conditions:
Q (e 1 ) = C 2 (e 1 ).
I assume that the solution (i * 1 , e * 1 ) is interior, and that the maximum net total surplus * is strictly positive.
If M1 and M2 do not trade with each other at date 2, the net total surplus for a given asset ownership structure A = {A 1 , A 2 } is π(A) = r (i 2 ; A 1 ) + q(e 2 ; A 2 ) − C 1 (i 1 + i 2 ) − C 2 (e 1 + e 2 ). To maximize π, obviously both i 1 and e 1 should be zero and the optimal i 2 and e 2 satisfy the following first-order conditions:
q (e 2 ; A 2 ) = C 2 (e 2 ). (4) I assume that the solution (i * 2 (A 1 ), e * 2 (A 2 )) is interior for every A, and that M1's payoff r (i * 2 ; A 1 )− C 1 (i * 2 ) and M2's payoff q(e * 2 ; A 2 ) − C 2 (e * 2 ) are both positive. Under Assumption 2, the first-best solution is for M1 and M2 to trade: the optimal investment levels are (i * 1 , 0) for M1 and (e * 1 , 0) for M2, and the maximum net total surplus is * . Because of contract incompleteness, the first-best solution is in general not attainable. For a benchmark second-best solution, consider the case in which there are no outside options for either party, i.e., r (i 2 ; A 1 ) = q(e 2 ; A 2 ) = 0 for any i 2 , e 2 , A 1 , and A 2 . This can happen if the two parties sign an enforceable, mutually exclusive trade contract. In this case, clearly i 2 and e 2 should be zero. At date 2, M1 and M2 are going to split the ex post surplus of S = R(i 1 ) + Q(e 1 ). The firstorder conditions for the equilibrium investment levels are (again, assuming interior solutions) as follows:
1 2 Q (e 1 ) = C 2 (e 1 ).
Let the solutions to (5) and (6) beī 1 andē 1 . Comparing (5) and (6) with (1) and (2) shows that the equilibrium investments will be lower than in the first-best solution. That is, there will be underinvestment as a result of ex post surplus sharing.
Equilibrium characterization
In this section I characterize the set of equilibria for the game for a fixed asset ownership structure A. In Section 5 I find the optimal ownership structure that gives rise to the largest total surplus. Throughout, I shall focus on pure-strategy equilibria only.
Given investment levels i = (i 1 , i 2 ) and e = (e 1 , e 2 ), if S − s = R(i 1 ) + Q(e 1 ) − [r (i 2 ; A 1 ) + q(e 2 ; A 2 )] ≥ 0, then M1 and M2 will trade with each other and the split-the-net-surplus solution says that M1 will get a surplus of r (i 2 ; A 1 ) + (S − s)/2 and M2 will get a surplus of q(e 2 ; A 2 ) + (S − s)/2. The payoff functions can be rewritten as
Assuming interior solutions, the optimal investment levels satisfy the following first-order conditions:
1 2 Q (e 1 ) = 1 2 q (e 2 ; A 2 ) = C 2 (e 1 + e 2 ).
Denote the solutions to (9) and (10) by (î 1 ,î 2 )(A 1 ) and (ê 1 ,ê 2 )(A 2 ), respectively. LetÛ 1 (Û 2 ) denote M1's (M2's) payoff with these investment choices in the trade equilibrium (if it exists). For these investment choices to constitute a trade equilibrium, a necessary condition is that the total surplus within the relationship exceed the sum of the two parties' outside options. If this condition fails for investment choices (î 1 ,î 2 )(A 1 ) by M1 and (ê 1 ,ê 2 )(A 2 ) by M2, one may expect that there can exist a trade equilibrium in which both parties make more specific investments. A bit surprisingly, this is not the case.
Lemma 2. A necessary condition for any trade equilibrium to exist isŜ
Lemma 2 says that to sustain a trade equilibrium, the surplus must be higher within the relationship than outside it when each party invests optimally in specific and general investments. Otherwise the two parties have to "overinvest" in specific investments to generate enough surplus for trade to be mutually beneficial. But this is not sustainable in equilibrium because both would shirk on specific investments and increase general investments, eventually leading to no trade.
Corollary 1.
There can be at most one trade equilibrium, in which the investment choices are {(î 1 ,î 2 (A 1 )), (ê 1 ,ê 2 (A 2 ))}.
Proof. From Lemma 2, if a trade equilibrium exists, thenŜ −ŝ ≥ 0. It follows that {(î 1 ,î 2 (A 1 )), (ê 1 ,ê 2 (A 2 ))} are dominant strategies.
Q.E.D.
To concentrate on interesting cases, I make the following assumption, which is slightly stronger than saying thatŜ −ŝ > 0.
Assumption 4. For any ownership structure, assume R(î 1 ) > r (î 2 ; A 1 ) and Q(ê 1 ) > q(ê 2 ; A 2 ).
Assumption 4 is satisfied when R (i) ≥ r (i; A 1 ) and Q (e) ≥ q (e; A 2 ). This is because (9) and (10) will then implyî 1 ≥î 2 andê 1 ≥ê 2 , Assumptions 1 and 2 then imply that R(î 1 ) ≥ R(î 2 ) > r (î 2 ; A 1 ) and Q(ê 1 ) ≥ Q(ê 2 ) > q(ê 2 ; A 2 ). In other words, if investments are relationspecific in a marginal sense (as assumed in Hart (1995)), then it is beneficial for the two parties to trade with each other once they make the investment choices given by (9) and (10). Now let us consider a no-trade equilibrium. If M1 and M2 do not trade, then M1's payoff is r (i 2 ; A 1 ) − C 1 (i 1 + i 2 ) and M2's payoff is q(e 2 ; A 2 ) − C 2 (e 1 + e 2 ). Clearly, both parties will make zero specific investment, and the optimal general investments i * 2 (A 1 ) and e * 2 (A 2 ) are given by (3) and (4). A necessary condition for these investment choices to be a no-trade equilibrium is that the total surplus generated within the relationship is less than the sum of the two parties' outside options. Similar to Lemma 2, this condition is necessary for the existence of any no-trade equilibrium.
Lemma 3. A necessary condition for any no-trade equilibrium to exist is
Lemma 3 says that to sustain a no-trade equilibrium, the surplus must be higher outside the relationship than within it when each party invests optimally in general investment. Otherwise the two parties have to "overinvest" in general investments to generate enough surplus for no trade to be mutually beneficial. But this is not sustainable in equilibrium because both would shirk on general investments to the point that trade with each other is preferred.
Corollary 2. There can be at most one no-trade equilibrium, in which the investment choices are {(0, i * 2 (A 1 )), (0, e * 2 (A 2 ))}. Assumption 5. For any ownership structure, assume R(0) < r (i * 2 ; A 1 ) and Q(0) < q(e * 2 ; A 2 ).
To further simplify matters, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 6. For any ownership structure, assume that
This says that when one party invests only in general investment, the surplus within the relationship is sufficiently large to justify trade as long as the other party invests as in the trade equilibrium. Assumption 6 will be satisfied if R(î 1 ) − r (î 2 ; A 1 ) and Q(ê 1 ) − q(ê 2 ; A 2 ) are sufficiently large (see Assumption 4) or if specific investments are sufficiently more productive than general investments for both parties. Roughly speaking, Assumption 6 requires that both parties be critical to the trade (i.e., sufficiently productive within the relationship). If Assumption 6 does not hold, then the no-trade equilibrium can be the unique equilibrium for some parameter values, in which case joint ownership will be inferior (see the discussion at the end of Section 5).
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Proof. See the Appendix. (ê 1 +ê 2 ) . In words,Ū 1 is the payoff M1 would get if M1's strategy and M2's strategy are mismatched: M1 invests as in the trade equilibrium while M2 invests as in the no-trade equilibrium. Clearly, we haveÛ 1 >Ū 1 andÛ 2 >Ū 2 . The following proposition characterizes the set of equilibria for the game. 
Optimality of joint ownership
Based on the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 1, let us now turn to the comparison of ownership structures. The conventional approach is to examine the first-order conditions of (9) and (10): under conventional differentiability and convexity conditions, higher A 1 leads to greater i 2 and hence lower i 1 . A more powerful approach is to use the monotone comparative statics developed by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , in which differentiability and convexity are not necessary for the purpose of comparative statics. To use this approach, let us examine the two parties' payoff functions given by (7) and (8). Under Assumptions 1 and 3, U 1 is supermodular in (−i 1 , i 2 ) (i.e., having positive cross-partial derivatives) and has increasing differences in (−i 1 , i 2 ; A 1 ) (i.e., marginal returns of −i 1 and i 2 are both increasing in A 1 ). Therefore, by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , the optimal (−i 1 , i 2 ) is nondecreasing in A 1 . Similarly, the optimal (−e 1 , e 2 ) is nondecreasing in A 2 . Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the trade equilibrium, asset ownership by one party decreases his/her incentives to make specific investments and increases his/her incentives to make general investments.
Since general investments are a complete waste when M1 and M2 eventually trade with each other, Proposition 2 reaches the opposite conclusion with the GHM approach: the more assets one party owns exclusively, the fewer incentives to make specific investments. 15 The intuition for this result is simple. Because asset ownership increases the marginal productivity of general investments, more assets lead to greater general investments. And because general and specific investments are substitutes in my model, more assets lead to lower specific investments. In contrast, when general and specific investments are complementary (as in GHM), owning more assets leads to greater specific investments as well as general investments.
Although owning more assets discourages a party from making specific investments, it benefits the owner individually. From the expression ofÛ 1 , we can see thatÛ 1 is increasing in A 1 and decreasing in A 2 , because r (i 2 ; A 1 ) is increasing in A 1 and q(e 1 ; A 2 ) is increasing in A 2 . The idea is that owning more assets allows one party to hold up his opponent more strongly and hence enables him to get a larger share of the total surplus.
Note that Proposition 2 holds in more general settings. For example, suppose one party's investments affect the other party's values, and that investments by the two parties are complementary. Specifically, suppose R(i 1 , e 1 ) and Q(e 1 , i 1 ) are increasing in both elements and have positive cross-partial derivatives, and r (i 2 , e 2 ; A 1 ) and q(e 2 , i 2 ; A 2 ) are increasing and have positive cross-partial derivatives in the first two elements. Assuming that M1 and M2 will always trade at date 2, then the game has strategic complementarities. From Theorems 12 and 13 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , equilibrium investment levels can be ranked, i.e., (−i 1 , i 2 ) and (−e 1 , e 2 ) move in the same direction. Moreover, (−i 1 , i 2 ) ((−e 1 , e 2 )) is nondecreasing in A 1 (A 2 ) in the two extreme equilibria (would be the same when the equilibrium is unique), which is what Proposition 2 says.
Since the total net surplus in the trade equilibrium, R(î 1 ) + Q(ê 1 ) − C 1 (î 1 +î 2 ) − C 2 (ê 1 +ê 2 ), is increasing in the two parties' specific investments and decreasing in their general investments, the following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. In the trade equilibrium, joint ownership achieves the greatest total surplus among all ownership structures.
Proof. Since under joint ownership r (i 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = r (i 2 ; φ) + α 1 B 12 and q(e 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = q(e 2 ; φ) + (1 − α 1 )B 12 , the first-order conditions for equilibrium investments, (9) and (10), are (1/2)R (i 1 ) = (1/2)r (i 2 ; φ) = C 1 (i 1 + i 2 ) and (1/2)Q (e 1 ) = (1/2)q (e 2 ; φ) = C 2 (e 1 + e 2 ). If M1 owns both assets a 1 and a 2 , equilibrium investments are given by (1/2)R (i 1 ) = (1/2)r (i 2 ; {a 1 , a 2 }) = C 1 (i 1 + i 2 ) and (1/2)Q (e 1 ) = (1/2)q (e 2 ; φ) = C 2 (e 1 + e 2 ). Clearly, M2's investment choice is identical under both ownership structures. By Proposition 2, M1 will make more specific investment i 1 and less general investment i 2 under joint ownership than under M1 integration. Thus, joint ownership dominates M1 integration, and it dominates M2 integration by symmetry. It is also easy to see that under nonintegration (M1 owns a 1 and M2 owns a 2 ), both managers make more general investments and fewer specific investments than under joint ownership, so nonintegration is dominated by joint ownership.
Joint ownership also dominates outside ownership. To see this, note that with an outside owner (the conclusion holds more strongly for a larger number of outside owners), each player gets his/her disagreement payoff plus one-third of the net surplus from trade. Hence, we have
The first-order conditions are (1/3)R (i 1 ) = (2/3)r (i 2 ; φ) = C 1 (i 1 + i 2 ) and (1/3)Q (e 1 ) = (2/3)q (e 2 ; φ) = C 2 (e 1 + e 2 ). Compared with joint ownership, we can see that both M1 and M2 will make fewer specific investments and more general investments, because private marginal returns of specific investments are more diluted and private marginal returns of general investments are better protected. Therefore, joint ownership dominates outside ownership.
Q.E.D.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is simple. Because owning more assets increases one's incentives to make general investment but decreases one's incentives to make specific investment, the optimal ownership structure should take away assets from the exclusive control of either party as much as possible. Joint ownership does exactly that. Outside ownership also takes away control of assets from M1 and M2, but an outside owner will share some of the surplus created by M1 and M2, which reduces M1's and M2's incentives to make specific investments. Moreover, diluted ownership makes the payoffs of M1 and M2 depend more on their disagreement payoffs, which further strengthens their incentives to make general investments (without the help of assets).
Next I want to determine the efficiency property of the trade equilibrium under asset ownership structures relative to some "contracting" solutions. Comparing (9) and (10) with (5) and (6), we can see that for any asset ownership structure,î 1 ≤ī 1 andê 1 ≤ē 1 because of the convexity of C 1 and C 2 (i.e., substitution of specific and general investments). The equalities hold only whenî 2 =ê 2 = 0. Therefore, relative to the case without outside options, disincentives to make productive specific investment are more severe under any ownership structure.
Proposition 4. In the trade equilibrium, specific investments will be underprovided under any ownership structure even relative to the case without outside options.
Since only the second-best can be achieved when outside options are not available (e.g., through exclusive trade contracts), Proposition 4 implies that the outcomes in cases where the two parties have outside options are third-best solutions. When outside options cannot be ruled out, spending on general investments is equivalent to building an arsenal against the other party in order to hold up her/him more strongly. Relative to the first-best solution, there are two sources of underprovision of productive investment in my model: ex post surplus sharing (i.e., hold-up) and ex ante spending on an arsenal. Joint ownership gives rise to the optimal third-best solution because it reduces the incentives to engage in general investments.
So far we have assumed that general investments do not generate surplus within the relationship. This can be relaxed under reasonable conditions (and thus justify the term "general"). Suppose general investment i 2 by M1 generates a surplus of H (i 2 ) within the relationship as well as r (i 2 ; A 1 ) outside the relationship. Assume that R (i) > r (i) ≥ H (i). The first-best investment choice for M1 satisfies the following first-order conditions (assuming interior solutions):
while the equilibrium conditions from (9) become 1 2 R (i 1 ) = 1 2 H (i 2 ) + 1 2 r (i 2 ; A 1 ) = C 1 (i 1 + i 2 ).
By the monotone comparative statics of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , the equilibrium specific investmentî 1 (A 1 ) must be less than the first-best level i * 1 and the equilibrium general investment i 2 (A 1 ) must be greater than the first-best level i * 2 . Similar to Proposition 2,î 1 (A 1 ) is decreasing in A 1 andî 2 (A 1 ) is increasing in A 2 . Therefore joint ownership is still optimal, since it reduces overinvesting in general investments and underinvesting in specific investment.
From Proposition 1, no trade can be an equilibrium outcome of the game. In fact, it is possible that a no-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game when Assumption 6 does not hold. With nonrenegotiable asset ownership, if M1 and M2 do not trade with each other, joint ownership is the worst possible ownership structure, because incentives to make general investments are minimal (no specific investments will be made under any ownership structure if no trade is expected). This is obvious: if they are not going to trade with each other, why tie themselves up with joint ownership? Thus, if M1 and M2 are to play the no-trade equilibrium, then they will choose to avoid joint ownership at date 0. Since Assumption 6 requires that both parties be critical (i.e., very productive within the relationship), trade is not likely to take place in a business relationship that has a high degree of asset specificity but in which one party has high productivity outside it. Of course, in such cases joint asset ownership will not be observed.
Conclusion
I have shown that joint ownership can serve as a mutual commitment mechanism to promote relation-specific investments when players endogenously choose the level of specificity in their relationships. The argument can be extended to a dynamic setting with multiple investment stages. It can be shown that joint ownership provides the best dynamic investment incentives because gains from deviations (i.e., to make general investments) are the smallest and punishments for deviations are the largest (i.e., the no-trade equilibrium). Even with only two investment stages, it is possible to achieve the first-best outcome.
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Given that the model predicts that joint ownership is optimal, one must wonder why it is not a dominant ownership form in the real world. Several reasons can be given. First, some of the key assumptions in the model may not hold in many contexts. Perhaps the most important is that specific and general investments are substitutes. When investments are in human capital, and the cost of investments is mainly time, this assumption seems plausible. Otherwise, it is less clear whether the assumption makes sense. Of course, whether specific and general investments are substitutes or complements depends on contexts and is ultimately an empirical issue. Assumption 6, which requires both parties to be sufficiently productive within the relationship, may be hard to satisfy, too. Secondly, joint ownership may result in considerable governance costs. When multiple parties jointly own a firm, they have to reach agreements on how to use the assets effectively. The costs in making collective decisions can be quite substantial, especially when these owners have diverse preferences (Hansmann, 1996; Cai and Milgrom, 1999) . The difficulties in making effective decisions may increase as the number of owners increases (Cai, 1997) . These ex post governance costs may outweigh the ex ante investment-incentives benefits under joint ownership, making joint ownership less attractive. Finally, ownership structure may respond to important issues other than providing investment incentives (Holmström and Roberts, 1998) , and joint ownership may lose its appeal on those issues. Asset ownership can be a useful instrument in resolving agency problems (Holmström and Milgrom, 1994) , and joint ownership may score badly in this field. For example, if asset maintenance is important but noncontractible, then asset value will be better protected under single ownership than under joint ownership. Moreover, asset ownership provides monitoring incentives to the owners (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) , and joint ownership can create additional free-riding probles in monitoring.
